

INTRODUCTION

There is still much historical work to be done on the early period of exile. On the one hand, the traditional texts of Joan Sauret, Felip Calvet i Costa and J M Rosich and some of the Spanish classics are still referred to frequently. On the other hand, the most recent studies of Daniel Díaz Esculies, Josep Benet or Miquel Caminal, amongst others, have shown us that there is still a long way to go in terms of exhausting primary sources and confirming of lines of research. The existing bibliography demonstrates that there is great fragmentation and division in studies about the Catalan exile of 1939. In other words, we are still lacking an integrated panoramic, general and structured view of this period of contemporary history.¹

This thesis addresses the historiographical gap relating to the Catalan exile of 1939 to 1950 that Francesc Vilanova and others have identified. A complete account of Catalan opposition to Franco must include a general and comprehensive work on the Catalan exile of 1939 through to 1950. Such a work is presented here.

The dispersion of Catalans in exile necessarily had historiographical as well as historical consequences, making its study relatively difficult. Francesc Vilanova has emphasised the difficulty of researching Catalan opposition in this particular period due to the various experiences of the exile. With each local population came a specific set of cultural, social and political circumstances, each following a particular course, according to a unique set of currents. The result, for Vilanova, militates against establishing an overall or integrated vision of the period.²

The focus of the study is the failure of Catalan political groups both inside and beyond Spanish borders to organise effective political opposition to Franco in the 1940s. The thesis offers improved understanding of both the phenomenon of Francoism and of opposition to it. It seeks to provide insight

¹ F. Vilanova, *Als dos costats de la frontera* (Barcelona, Abadia de Montserrat, 2001), p. 10.

² Vilanova, *Als dos costats*, p. 16.

into the origins of Catalan political parties, and their development, which casts more light on present day Catalan political culture and organisation.

Two key insights are suggested by the study. First, it shows that the failure of Catalans to organise cohesive opposition to Franco between 1939 and 1950 was not simply attributable to international factors, as existing accounts have suggested, but was, in some measure, due to divisions within Catalan nationalism itself. The thesis also investigates the extent to which the failure of Catalans was due to internal or external factors.

A second claim of the thesis is that Catalans could have effectively opposed Franco only through an alliance with the left wing groups in opposition – in other words, by presenting a common front against Franco. It is the contention of the author of this study that as an isolated political force, Catalan nationalism could achieve little more than local irritation of the regime. With a restoration of the republic offering the sole realistic means of overthrowing Franco³, and given the extent to which this was recognised by members of the Catalan movement, it is possible to point to a failure to focus sufficiently on the necessary alliance and the consequent failure to orchestrate a common front against the Francoists as a principal cause of the failure of Catalan opposition.

Opposition to the regime was both extensive and varied. Following the Spanish Civil War and in some cases, prior to its conclusion, many decided to leave the country and to go into exile. A number remained, organising domestic forms of opposition. It is useful to distinguish internal and external opposition to the regime. In this study, internal opposition to the regime refers to those internal dissident elements within Francoism. External opposition instead refers to forces outside the boundaries of the regime, in particular, the forces of the Left and the regional nationalists. Internal and external opposition could be found both inside and outside the Spanish territory. Internal opposition included members of the Falangist rank and file, dissatisfied with Franco's monopolisation of power, and disaffected monarchists, who had expected the dictator to restore the Spanish throne but soon realised that this was not going to happen.⁴ Among the external groups, it was the left-wing parties – the losing side in the Civil War – that led a varied and divided community of anarchists, Communists, Republicans,⁵ Socialists and

³ PRO FO 371/34821, C11/665. In 1943, Gil Robles claimed that if the Allies overthrew Franco, a left wing government could be installed in Spain. José María Gil Robles y Quiñones de León was the CEDA leader. He spent the war in Portugal. He was the leader of the legalist Right, later shunned by Franco.

⁴ Monarchist opposition has been treated by numerous authors such as J. M. Toquero, *Franco y Don Juan* (Barcelona, Plaza y Janés, 1989). A fundamental work concerning monarchist opposition is J. Tusell, *La oposición democrática al franquismo (1939-1962)* (Barcelona, Planeta, 1977).

⁵ To avoid confusion, Republican will be used for specifically Republican, i.e., liberal bourgeois parties (like Izquierda Republicana) and republicans will be used for all those for-

regionalists (Galician, Basque and Catalan nationalists⁶), amongst others. For the most part, the external opposition hoped to restore democracy in Spain. The various regionalist claims were based on a desire to obtain more autonomy for Galicia, the Basque country, and Catalonia. These three regions had historically enjoyed a greater or lesser degree of sovereignty and looked to recover it.

Catalan opposition was then a part of the external opposition to Franco, both domestically and abroad. Catalonia had a distinct culture, ethnicity, language and history.⁷ The Catalan nationalist objectives were to overthrow Franco, secure autonomy within a Castilian Spain, and ultimately attain complete self-determination within an Iberian federation. Overthrowing Franco was a necessary priority for Catalan nationalists since the dictator would never accept their demands for autonomy. Two central principles described the ideology of those Catalan nationalists opposed to Franco: the commitment to democracy and the principle of self-determination.⁸ The failure of Catalan opposition to Franco must be assessed then both in the context of the Catalan project, and in the wider context of its place in a more generalised failure of external opposition to Franco.⁹

Opposition to Franco took one of four political forms. Cultural opposition was based on the defence of the Catalan language and traditions, carried out through propaganda and a system of secret presses both inside Spain and abroad.¹⁰ Direct action was organised by youth groups, confronting the Fran-

ces that opposed the military rebels throughout the Spanish Civil War (which includes Communists, anarchists, Socialists and liberal Republicans). The most important publication to date is H. Heine's *La oposición política al franquismo de 1939 a 1952* (Barcelona, Editorial Crítica Grijalbo, 1983), whose coverage of the republican and monarchist opposition, both in Spain and in exile, is as yet unsurpassed. Heine's coverage of Catalan nationalism is good, but brief. Another work of note on the opposition in the 1940s is D. J. Dunthorn's "Britain and the Spanish Anti-Franco opposition 1940-1950" (Bristol, thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy at the University of West England, July 1999). Once again though, the focus is republican and monarchist opposition, rather than Catalan nationalism. Dunthorn's book has been published. David J. Dunthorn, *Britain and the Spanish anti-Franco opposition, 1940-1950* (London, Palgrave MacMillan, 2000).

⁶ The term Catalan is meant to include political parties other than Catalan nationalist ones. The term Catalan nationalist refers to all the Catalans with regional aspirations. It should not be confused with the term nationalist which was attached to the Francoist side during the Civil War. Catalan nationalism Catalan nationalism Catalan 'Basque nationalist' here however refers to Basque regionalism, and 'Galician nationalist' similarly is intended to represent Galician regionalism.

⁷ For an explanation of nations without a state see M. Guibernau, *Nacionalisme Català* (Barcelona, Pòrtic, 2002), p. 27 and for the reasons of the emergence of Catalan opposition to Franco see Guibernau, *Nacionalisme Català* p. 48.

⁸ APSG, 1943, *L'hora de Catalunya, 'Per la pàtria i per la llibertat'*.

⁹ P. Vilar, *Història de Catalunya* (Barcelona, Edicions 62, 1988).

¹⁰ A good definition of cultural resistance may be found in M. Guibernau, *Los Nacionalismos* (Barcelona, Ariel, 1996), pp. 119-120.

coist apparatus head-on and attempting to stage local and general strikes.¹¹ Also, a certain amount of political lobbying had to be done in the international political arena. It was believed that, by supporting the Allied effort in World War II through the cooperation of secret agents and sharing networks of secret information, Catalan nationalism would, in return, receive support from the international community. Catalan institutional opposition, in the event, remained meagre, with no institution of government from 1939 to 1945, and all attempts to resuscitate the *Generalitat* (the main Catalan governmental institution) ending in failure.

The aspiration to regional autonomy was shared by other groups in Spain. In this, the Catalan nationalists felt very close to the Basque nationalists. Unlike the Catalan nationalists, the Basque nationalist groups united under the aegis of a single party, the Partido Nacionalista Vasco (Basque Nationalist Party, PNV), which coordinated Basque nationalist activity both at home and abroad. Better funded, Basque nationalism provided a major ally with strategic interests in common.¹²

The Basque nationalists were better organised than the Catalan nationalists, yet achieved relatively little more, except perhaps a higher intensity of reaction from Franco. Less organised, the Catalans were taken to present less of a material threat to the dictatorship. The Galicians were a third group to express demands for regional autonomy in the period. Despite a comparable historical claim however, the Galicians did not achieve a comparable level of political organisation, and carried much less weight at the national level.¹³

A certain amount of realpolitik would have its influence on policy. Thinking that the Western powers would favour restoration of a republic after the war, an effort was made to make common cause with the republican groups.¹⁴ There were attempts to form alliances with the groups of the left, in the main, the Socialists, as well as the Republicans, but these were never more than sporadic and did not endure.¹⁵

¹¹ A. Viladot i Presas, *Nacionalisme i premsa clandestina (1939-1951)* (Barcelona, Curial, 1987), pp. 192-194.

¹² The Basque exile is not directly in the scope of this study, except insofar as it impacts on the issues at hand. The works of J. C. Jiménez de Aberasturi Corta, *De la derrota a la esperanza: Políticas vascas durante la II Guerra Mundial (37-47)* (Bilbao, Instituto Vasco de Administración pública, 1999) and S.P. Pablo, L. Mees, J.A., Rodríguez Ranz, *El péndulo patriótico, Historia del Partido Nacionalista Vasco, Vol. I and II (1895-1975)* (Crítica-Contrastes, Barcelona, 2001) provide a full account of the Basque regionalists in this period.

¹³ The Galicians, like the Basques, will be examined only insofar as they have influence on the Catalans.

¹⁴ Some voices from the British Foreign Office confirmed that the most likely option in case of the overthrow of Franco would have been a restoration of the republic. PRO File FO 371/49582, Joan Ventosa's documents, Victor Mallet to Sir Bevin, London, 30-10-1945, PRO, File FO 371/39744, Letter Lizaso to Aguirre, Basques relations with the left, London, 10-12-1944.

¹⁵ The left-wing opposition to Franco will be considered in this study insofar as it related to the Catalans.

The period 1939-1950 is very significant for the development of Catalan nationalism. Though winning the Civil War, which had ended 1 April 1939, the Francoist regime had not yet fully taken root. As Francoism began to consolidate, a basis of opposition developed. The Catalan side was expectant and hopeful of assistance from the international community. Between 1939 and 1950, the Catalan opposition passed through several stages of development.

Though many refugees left Spain after 1 April 1939, a huge number had already begun to seek refuge abroad from the beginning of that year, fearing a Francoist victory in the Civil War. The majority of Catalans that left Catalonia did it before the fall of Barcelona. It is calculated that around 300,000 Catalans left during this period. Once Barcelona fell to Francoist hands¹⁶, borders were closed and it became progressively more difficult to leave the country. The situation for Catalans under Franco became very difficult. It is estimated that Catalonia's population in 1939 was approximately 1,300,000 people, and that some 300,000 Catalans went in exile after 1939. Among these, very few Catalans participated in the anti-Francoist Catalan parties (perhaps between 10 and 15 per cent) since the majority were largely preoccupied with the question of their own survival.¹⁷ Up to 1940, opposition was halting, doubtful and somewhat anaemic after the Civil War. With fascism on the march and an expectation that Hitler would prevail in World War II, it seemed that the Francoist hold on power would be confirmed. During 1939-1940, Catalan activity focused on France. 1940-1942 was a more successful period for Catalan nationalism that was organising in the UK, USA and Latin America.

If the preceding years appeared to offer promise, 1942-1944 was a period of crisis and scant activity for Catalan nationalism. The anti-Francoist opposition expected that, after a victory of the Allies over the Axis powers and the overthrow of Hitler and Mussolini, collaboration with those forces seeking to overturn the Francoist regime would be a natural next step. During the period lasting from 1944 to 1946, the Catalan opposition perhaps reached its zenith. Both the international and Spanish framework of the period is central to understanding the development of Catalan nationalism. The experience of the Civil War (1936-1939) took a huge toll, morally and mate-

¹⁶ The fall of Barcelona to Francoist hands is very well documented in AT, Poblet, Box C1579, 'El fina de la república'. For some secondary literature on this topic, see R.Carr, *The Republic and the Civil War in Spain* (London, McMillan, 1971), E.Ucelay da Cal, *La Catalunya populista: Imatge, cultura i política en l'etapa republicana (1931-1939)* (Barcelona, Magrana, 1982), A.Aranzazu, *Ve y cuenta lo que pasó en España* (Barcelona, Planeta, 2000); F.Vilanova, *Les ruptures de l'any 1939* (Barcelona, Fundació Pi i Sunyer, 2000); M.Risques, F.Vilanova and R.Vinyes, *1939 Barcelona any zero. Història gràfica de l'ocupació de la ciutat* (Barcelona, Edicions Proa, 1999); J. Villarroya i Font, *1939 Derrota i exili* (Barcelona, Generalitat de Catalunya, 2000).

¹⁷ *Gran Enciclopèdia Catalana Vol.IV* (Barcelona, Enciclopèdia Catalana, 1973).

rially. The violence and repression of the Civil War in Spain had been ferocious, and the loss of life severe. The anti-Francoist opposition found itself in no position to enter another conflict, lacking the will, the resources, and the unity required for it. Although Spain remained neutral when World War II broke out in 1939, the prevailing atmosphere of threat and insecurity affected the Spanish psyche, further weakening the will to fight against the Francoist regime, all the more so whilst an Axis victory seemed in prospect. At the beginning of hostilities, Spaniards feared a German invasion of Spain. The ambiguity concerning diplomatic intent and subsequent withdrawal of international support had been problematic. Later on, an Allied victory in Europe proved less propitious to the Catalan cause than had been hoped.

The efficiency of the Francoist repression also had severe effects. Franco successfully established a dictatorship, supported by a very efficient machinery of repression, impeding the formation of solid political opposition. As, in time, he was careful to point out to both the international community and to the Spanish middle and upper classes, Franco could ensure stability.¹⁸ Shrewdly, Franco catered for the interests of the moderates, fought very vigorously against monarchist opposition and presented himself as the only viable alternative to a Communist succession. So much is duly recognised in the literature. It is also true that Catalan nationalism may have itself contributed to the set of factors ranged against it.

The present study examines those internal reasons for the failure among Catalans. Their shortcomings and mistakes were various and significant. As has already been indicated, the Catalans lacked the confidence to recover and reorganise after Civil War; whilst aware of the restrictions it imposed, they could not manage to overcome their tendency to faction and dispute. The representative institutional organisations required to legitimise the struggle were not established. A government was not created in exile. Common cause was not made between those at home and abroad, and the strength and effectiveness of the regime was persistently underestimated. In such circumstances, a credible democratic alternative to Franco was not developed.

The Catalan exile posed particular difficulties of organisation. More, those in opposition were insufficiently pragmatic; their personal clashes proved stronger than any desire for unity. In fact, all those opposition groups finding themselves in exile were, in the event, reluctant to make political concessions. By extension, Catalan groups were not able to establish good relations either with the Left or with other opposition forces. If a cohesive bloc was required to overthrow Franco, a lack of clear leadership and certain arro-

¹⁸ H. Heine, *La oposició*, p. 478. J.M. Solé I Sabaté, *La repressió franquista a Catalunya (1938-1953)* (Barcelona, Edicions 62, 1985); M. Richards, *A time of silence, Civil War and the culture of repression in Franco's Spain (1936-45)* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1998).

gance on the part of disparate groups prevented its formation. The international powers were not presented with a realistic alternative to Franco. Fresh memories of the Civil War, in which Left and Right had been rivals, had made it hard to reach compromises; it was difficult to accept as allies, those who had been regarded at best with suspicion. Finally, the Catalans relied too much, and arguably a little naively on the help of the Allies, even if it had not been promised formally. Allied diplomacy, particularly British diplomacy in Spain, Europe and around the world was one of anti-fascism and, even more important, one of anti-Communism. If Catalans had united with the rest of the anti-Francoists groups, especially anti-fascist and anti-Communist groups (since they subscribed to these ideologies), and had presented a cohesive bloc to the eyes of the Allies, they would have stood a chance of overthrowing Franco. The evidence that key movers (UK, USA and UN) were not looking to get into bed with Franco, even if covertly, is that they condemned his policies and made some contacts with the anti-Francoists. Furthermore, the Allies only approved of Francoism when they were pushed to take anti-Communist measures facing the beginning of the Cold War.

HISTORIOGRAPHY

There are a number of excellent works on aspects of anti-Francoist opposition. The focus tends to be very much on Republican, monarchist and Basque nationalist opposition to Franco rather than on the Catalan nationalism per se. There is also a tendency in the literature to cite external factors for the failure of opposition to Franco, rather than internal factors. A number of writers contend that the principal reason for the failure of the opposition was the lack of international help. By contrast, only in a few works like Jose Borrás' *Políticas de los exiliados españoles 1944-1950*,¹⁹ is it argued that organisation may have been lacking in opposition forces, and that responsibility for that cannot be laid elsewhere. Borrás' treatment however, is not focused on Catalan nationalism.

As has been said, there is as yet no full account of Catalan opposition, as is the case for monarchist, Basque nationalist or Republican opposition. Here, secondary material has been consulted in order to develop an integrated view of Catalan nationalism in the 1940s, such as Francesc Vilanova's *Als dos costats de la frontera, relacions polítiques entre exili i interior a la postguerra, 1939-1948*,²⁰ and *Les ruptures de l'any 1939*.²¹ Again though, Vi-

¹⁹ J. Borrás, *Políticas de los exiliados españoles 1944-1950* (París, Ruedo Ibérico 1976).

²⁰ F. Vilanova, *Als dos costats de la frontera, relacions polítiques entre exili i interior a la postguerra, 1939-1948* (Barcelona, Biblioteca Serra d'Or, Publicacions de l' Abadia de Montserrat, 2001).

²¹ F. Vilanova, *Les ruptures de l'any 1939* (Barcelona, Publicacions de l' Abadia de Montserrat, 2000).

lanova - albeit explicitly - does not give a comprehensive account of the period. In particular, *Les ruptures de l'any 1939* focuses exclusively on the end of the Civil War and the first exile to France. *Als dos costats de la frontera* surveys a wider period, but focuses on Catalan developments in France and Spain alone.

Montserrat Guibernau's *Nacionalisme Català*²² points to personal failures in Catalan leaders preventing the movement from getting organised. Guibernau explains the incapacity of Catalan opposition to found a unified bloc, the division between those in exile and those in Spain, and their *naïveté* in relying on unconditional support from the Allies. Guibernau then suggestively indicates several arguments for failure but, given the wide chronological span of her study, does not set out to provide a full historical account.²³

Given the poverty of printed sources, public and private archives have provided the principal primary sources for this study. A comprehensive list of sources is given in the bibliography. Several sources have proved of particular value.²⁴ Concerning primary sources, the memories of Carles Pi i Sunyer are crucial since he was one of the main political leaders of the period and he described every political move he made in detail. Nonetheless, Pi i Sunyer provides only a partial view of the development of Catalan nationalism in the 1940s. Some reference has been made to British archives, particularly those documents of the Public Record Office received by the British Foreign Office from Embassy and Consular staff in Spain. These have proved of use in tracing the British perspective on the creation and development of the Catalan opposition. Furthermore, they have proved useful in order to trace British and Allied diplomacy towards the Spanish question in the 1940s. Two Catalan archives contributed particularly to the study: namely, the Pi i Sunyer foundation and the Tarradellas archive. The Pi i Sunyer foundation, in Barcelona, collects the correspondence between Carles Pi i Sunyer and other leaders of right-wing Catalan nationalism in the 1940s. The Tarradellas archive in Poblet provides a very broad account of the left-wing spectrum of Catalan nationalism in the 1940s through correspondence between Josep Tarradellas and others in the movement. By researching these two archives, an integrated view of both the right- and left-wing Catalan opposition to Franco during the 1940s was built up.

The thesis also makes reference to a number of interviews conducted by the author with some of the relevant figures from the period. Few of those figures are still alive, which is why their testimony becomes very valuable. Fi-

²² Guibernau, *Nacionalisme Català*.

²³ Guibernau, *Nacionalisme Català*, p. 96.

²⁴ Tarradellas archive- Poblet- Catalonia-Spain; -Archive of the Basque nationalist party in Artea- Basque country-Spain; -Pi i Sunyer foundation-Barcelona-Spain; -Personal archive of the *Síndic de Greuges* (Catalan ombudsman), Antón Cañellas-Barcelona-Spain; -Varela's private archive, Cádiz-Spain; -Pabelló Sert, Pabelló de la República, centre d'estudis d'Història contemporània- Barcelona- Spain; -Public Record Office (London), UK.

nally, it should be noted that the study focuses on European developments (particularly those in Spain, France, and the UK), rather than those in the American communities. The majority of, and most significant of Catalan political decisions and developments happened in Europe. This being the case, the American communities are not of such central relevance, but certain aspects of this exile are examined in chapters 4 and 5 and the research in the main concerns the press.

STRUCTURE

The context and antecedents of Catalan opposition up to 1939 are considered in **Chapter 1**. This heritage was responsible for certain features of the movement of the 1940s. The chapter includes a summary of the impact of the Civil War and the establishment of Francoism, with its efficient repressive measures, as well as the creation of anti-Francoist opposition groups. One of the priorities of the Francoist repressive machinery would be Catalan nationalism precisely because Catalan nationalism had developed politically in the first quarter of the century and was considered a threat for Francoist centralist policy. During the last quarter of the XIX century and the first quarter of the XX century, Catalan nationalism had developed a concrete political programme. Its principal party during the period had been the Lliga, a moderate Catalan political party led by the Catalan businessman Francesc Cambó. Catalans produced the first documents to compile their political aspirations in the *Memorial de Greuges* and the *Bases de Manresa*. Catalans also founded the first institutional embodiment of, and vehicle for their demands, the *Mancomunitat* (1914-1925). Catalan political organisation was backed by economic strength based on the development of the industrial revolution, which had made Catalonia the richest region of Spain. In the cultural domain, Catalan claims were supported by the *Renaixença*, a cultural movement of recovery of the Catalan language, history and identity.

These developments were, to an extent, a response to the centralist policies advocated and imposed under the *Restauración* system of Cánovas, based on an alternation in power of just two parties, the conservatives and the liberals. The system allowed for the monopolisation of power by rural landowners who controlled the vote, and who acted to repress regionalist claims quite severely. At the beginning of the XIXth century, Catalan nationalism had become politically organised.

Primo de Rivera's dictatorship between 1923 and 1930 would see the effective suspension of all such developments for seven years. The second republic in Spain (1931-1936) was welcomed by Catalans. The *Generalitat*, a Catalan government, was founded and presided over by Francesc Macià. After Macià's sudden death on Christmas Day 1933, he was replaced as president by Lluís Companys. The Catalans would also produce an *estatut*

(1932). The principal Catalan party of the period was Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya (ERC), a radical Catalan party which sought complete independence for the region. The Civil War (1936-1939) once again brought all developments to a standstill. Worse was to follow. Franco's Burgos decree in 1938 suspended the *Generalitat* and the Catalan statute. In the spring of 1939, as the Civil War drew to a close and the dictatorship was established, opposition to Franco began to foment. Catalan nationalism played an important role. Spain had been devastated by the Civil War and the losing side had scant resources and low reserves of morale. Franco moved quickly to capitalise on his victory and established totalitarian measures, including a very effective machinery of repression, which would be targeted against any potential sources or forms of opposition.

The Civil War caused a deep rift in Catalan society. Some sections of the wealthy Catalan bourgeoisie inclined to support Francoism believing that Franco better served their economic interests. Perhaps unsurprisingly, the move was considered a betrayal by hard core Catalans, and the fault line lay across a Catalonian society traumatised by the horrors of a Civil War. During the conflict, the *Generalitat*, conscious of its incapacitation, decided to allocate its remaining available financial resources to the Republican government. The funds would not be repaid, leaving the Catalans impoverished. The overall situation was then precarious in Catalonia. In conditions of great adversity, Catalans founded an opposition to the regime. A great number of Catalans decided to go into exile, seeking both refuge from Francoist repression and a place more conducive to achieving any sort of organisation.

Chapter 2 provides an account of the first Catalan exile to France from April 1939 to June 1940. The Catalan exodus to France is described, and an account is made of the problems faced by a movement indefinitely displaced and suffering the loss of its leader and primary governmental institution. The first destination for the refugees was neighbouring France, whose government welcomed the first Catalans to escape through the Pyrenees. The *Generalitat* and its president, Lluís Companys also moved to France. After his arrest in 1939 by the Germans, the *Generalitat* effectively ceased to exist. Catalans in France responded with efforts to found a unitary left-wing platform, the Front Nacional de Catalunya. Yet again, the development of Catalan political organisation met immediately with a severe obstacle, this time the German occupation of France in October 1940. Those Catalans in France were dispersed across a number of nuclei, and, after the arrest of Companys, found themselves without leadership. Due to their financial position, the scattered population relied upon the help of the Republicans and the Basque nationalists, which substantially reduced their capacity to manoeuvre. Policy was muddled and communication was poor between those remaining in Spain and those in exile, owing both to patchy networks of communication and to clashes of leadership.

The main subject of **Chapter 3** is the subsequent Catalan exile to Britain between July 1940 and August 1942. The chapter offers a full account of the Consell Nacional de Catalunya (National Catalan Council, CNC), the leading Catalan organisation at the time, and the challenge made by the French-based president by default, Josep Irla. After the German occupation of France, many Catalans sought refuge in the UK, since it was the last remaining democratic country in Europe ready to receive them. Catalan political activity between 1940 and 1942 settled there, under the leadership of Carles Pi i Sunyer, a member of ERC. An attempt to create a surrogate institution for the *Generalitat* in the UK was made, in the form of the Consell Nacional de Catalunya (CNC).

Chapter 4 is concerned with the same period as chapter 3. It provides an account of the Atlantic exile from July 1940 to August 1942, taking in events both in the USA and in Latin America. The impact of Miquel Santaló's mission, designed to wrest influence from the CNC is described. In parallel to the UK exile, there was also a significant Atlantic exile by Catalans, going both to the USA and to several countries in Latin America. The USA exile was less significant on account of the much smaller number of Catalans domiciled there. Nevertheless, the Catalan community in New York played a part in trying to lobby the American government and in seeking support from the Allies. By contrast, Catalans in Latin America organised themselves in *comunitats*, quite independent communities, based upon shared cultural and linguistic experience, which were ultimately responsible to the CNC of London. Mexico was the largest of these by some margin, followed by Argentina and Cuba. Not without difficulties, the period from 1940 to 1942 was quite a successful one for political Catalan nationalism.

Chapter 5 surveys developments in Catalan nationalism between August 1942 and October 1944, a time of crisis, confusion and disorder for Catalan nationalism. An account is made of the development of the Front Nacional de Catalunya (National Front of Catalonia, FNC), whose core activity was in France, and the Latin American based Junta de Liberación (JL), an attempt to create a unitary platform with the left-wing anti-Francoist forces. In November 1943, the Socialists and a variety of Spanish and Catalan liberal Republican groups joined together in Mexico to found the Junta Española de Liberación. Those Catalans in France did not accept the supremacy of the CNC of London, and Josep Irla, de facto president of the *Generalitat*, decided to send Miquel Santaló, an ERC member of France, to Mexico at the end of 1941 endowing him with presidential powers. The intention was a direct challenge and neutralisation of both Pi i Sunyer's power, and the strength of the CNC of London. The action would create confusion and division among Catalans, particularly amongst the *comunitats* in Latin America, which no longer knew to whom they should report. In response to the new arrangements, Pi i Sunyer decided to dissolve the CNC of London in 1943. If that part of the ERC initiative had succeeded, Miquel Santaló would

fail in his attempt to found a new Consell in Mexico and a new Catalan consensus.

Chapter 6 provides an account of developments of Catalan opposition between August 1944 and June 1945, as World War II approached its conclusion and Allied policy toward the Iberian Peninsula was revealed. The period from 1944 to 1945 was to an extent determined by the circumstances of the war's end. An Allied victory now seemed more than likely, fuelling Catalan hopes of soon obtaining support from the Allies. France, freed from German occupation in 1944, soon recovered its role as Catalan nationalism's centre stage. After the failure of Santaló's mission, Pi i Sunyer reconstituted a radicalised Consell of London in 1944 that would last just a year. In France, Catalan nationalism developed, led by the FNC. Other parties re-established themselves, such as EC and ERC.

The study is concluded in **Chapter 7**, with a consideration of what was, in effect, the onset of the Cold War. The reconstitution of the *Generalitat* and belated achievement of a degree of unity is discussed in the light of the Allies' seemingly have already determined on a policy of conciliation with the dictatorship. After 1947, the secret presses, which had done so much to support the struggle throughout the war years, fell silent; their ink - formerly the lifeblood of a culture under siege - dried up. A large number of Catalans returned home after the end of World War II. One of the most active Catalan groups, the Mexican one, had come back to Catalonia and had stopped fighting politically for Catalan reasons. Many members of the Mexican group were present in the popular homage to the Virgin of Montserrat on 27 April 1947, a Catalanist cultural and religious gathering. The currents of international politics too played their part. The Western powers did not wish Spain to enter World War II and accepted that Franco would remain in power since he maintained Spanish neutrality. The long awaited help from the Western powers never came. Indeed, it is often claimed that the Allies never seriously considered helping the anti-Francoist opposition. In November 1950, key members of the international community (the USA, France, UK and USSR) instructed their ambassadors to return to Spain, signalling an acceptance of Franco's regime. With the Iron Curtain descending, the Western powers were evidently more exercised by Communist expansionism: a fascist but neutral Spain was seemingly preferred to a Communist one. Recognition of this position caused a significant change in opposition attitudes. Better organisation on the anti-Francoist side could have elicited the desired response from the Western powers. If the anti-Francoist opposition would have presented a realistic solid alternative to Franco, the Allies would have been more prone to help them. The Allies were not pro-Francoists. They were anti-Communists and looked for the best possible means to ensure that Spain would not become Communist. With its former aspirations in tatters, Catalans looked to attempts at reconstituting the *Generalitat*, which was resurrected after repeated tries in 1945, and finally dissolved in 1948, leaving Catalans without

their principal institution. Moreover, Catalans made efforts to develop such unitary platforms as the CNDC (which intended to build a broad coalition including Basque nationalists and the left-wing opposition groups) to restore a sense of progress. It was, to an extent, too little too late: the Allies had already determined not to intervene in Spanish affairs. Anti-Francoists and Catalans alike did not command the resources to organise themselves. Catalans had not presented a credible alternative to the regime in the eyes of Western governments, and had signally failed in their own attempts to overthrow the dictatorship. Acceptance of the necessity of a broad, solid and stable consensus had come at a great cost, in time. For too long, at a critical period in the course of affairs, internal divisions and leadership clashes, as well as policy disagreements would impede any real collaboration and suffocate any capacity for organisation on the ground.